Saturday

Rocking your world?

Hello everyone, this post is about my favourate rocks! and the importance of attention to detail, in scientific communication.

If someone were to ask you, "What is your favourate ROCK ?" One might imagine responses such as emeralds, sapphires, rubies and please don't say it? the object of the greatest commercial propaganda campaign ever; The de Beers ethos that diamonds are forever..... and a women's best friend. But perhaps figuratively, your rock star maybe George Harrison, Kurt Cobain or the Guess jeans girl. Sigh......!

However, for me, my favourate rock would have to be the Schist's containing alumino-silicate polymorphs. Errghhh !!!! Sound to chemistry? Please don't barf because truly they are the origin of many materials one uses on a daily basis. Also producing wonders of crystallisation like this kyanite in the photo below.

Polymorphs are elements that exist in three temperature and pressure phases, with perhaps the most beautiful, water, inhabiting, solid ice, liquid aqua and gas steam. So too, some Alumino-silicates exist in three temperature and pressure phases of solid crystal kyanite, sillimanite and andalusite. Kyanite having a pretty blue/purple oblongs, sillimanite having cream coloured flaky fingers and andalusite having grey/pink granule spheres.

The photo below, by the Smithsonian Institute a prestigious American museum, shows the three solid examples of an alumino silicate polymorph described in the last paragraph. Also it illustrates the importance of, attention to detail, in scientific communication. Can anyone see the mistake in this photo? While it provides an excellent graphic explanation, the rock photos need to be rotated counter clockwise, one place, for the diagram to be correct. Please click on the highlighted link above for further investigation.

To me alumino silicate polymorphs are quite pretty? But only sometimes because usually they are just contained in a slab of squeezed and melted solidified "goo" of rock schist. However it is at the boundaries and gradations of the pressure and temperature regimes of the alumino-silicate polymorphs where geologists and metallurgists find the ores containing copper, lead and silver, amongst other elements.

Besides the European spelling of English, can anyone see any lack of, attention to detail, in this post? because it is usually the critic who makes the worst error.

Monday

What is India's Water Future?

Introduction
The topic of this essay suggests that while commentators narrate and argue about economics, international relations and political sovereignty, the question of whether India is an emerging political giant is factorial. Factorial because resource management, sustainable development and how the culture and politics of the Indian population emerge in a post “climate change” world will determine whether India is a political giant, just another giant or a giant problem! Using select topics, this essay argues that India’s interaction and management of fresh water issues are vital for its determination as a future giant civilisation.

Fresh water has nurtured and sustained many civilisations, ancient and modern, including China, Egypt, Mesopotamia and the focus here, the future hydrological aspirations of India. However in comparative terms water as an essential human and ecological need makes up barely a tenth, of a thousandth, of all the liquid water on Earth (Ball, 1999: 22). Mostly when visualising rivers in the abstract, they are seen as the dark blue curved line on a map. But this is only a small, final, part of the fresh water dynamics in a landscape. A river is the sum of, or the collection in a larger geographic area, of a basin or catchment as a “funnel like” harvest of rainfall or precipitation, captured and flowing as run off, either on the surface, over land or as groundwater through rock strata, by the force of gravity to a low point at sea level (Davie, 2003: 151).

Please right click on image for better view.

Sustained quantities of fresh, potable water for India’s population is problematic because of the diversity and immense interaction between culture and landscape. Modern India is a union of 35 states and territories that in the year 1900 had a population of 238 million, expanding to 1.03 billion in 2001. India is now the second most populous country in the world. This population has 28% urban residents and 72% rural dwellers, in approximately 600,000 villages. The 3,287726 square kilometres of India’s political borders is made up of 13 river basins, some shared with neighbouring states, in major geographic regions of the Himalayan Mountains, the Indo-Gangetic Plain, the Great Indian Desert, the Deccan Plateau and the Coastal Mountain Belts, with climates, from tropical wet, semi arid and arid(Fereidoun, 2007: 319).

Metaphorically, river basins or catchments can also be viewed as harvesting the cultural and political flow of the population from highland to lowland and countryside to urban dwelling. This interaction of the population with the “landscape” is also a creation of the “human mind” where the scenery is built up from the "strata" of memory and history, incorporating the physical influence and exploitation of rivers flowing over and through the landscape where a population dwells (Schama, 1995: 7).

Climate Change
Although an environmental imperative, climate change is also a current fashionable topic of political debate. This debate oftentimes hinders and confuses the prophecies, forecasts and predictions of climate change and the focus of India’s response to this challenge needs clarification. Firstly, with an increase in global temperatures glacial melt in the Himalayan Mountains would effect the amount of water run-off into rivers. This water runoff dictates the rapidity and volume of a river's water flow. Two geographical and cultural significant rivers, the Ganga and Yumuna are dependant on the summer melting of glaciers for a uniform perennial water supply. Complete melting of Himalayan glaciers would result in an initial catastrophic flooding of the plains and deltas followed by a water shortage as the water table lowers from the lack of snow melt replenishment (Chengappa, 2007: 42).

Secondly, a major characteristic of India’s weather is orographic precipitation, where rainfall, especially from water bearing air masses crossing the Arabian Sea, are forced to rise over India’s mountain ranges unloading Monsoon on the landscape. A significant feature of orographic precipitation/rainfall is that it leaves the opposite side of the mountain range, water poor, or technically in a “rain shadow” creating an arid region. This is the primary reason for the engineering of an inter-basin water transfer system discussed below, which involves moving water from abundant river basins to water poor river basins (Davie, 2003: 13).

Monsoon’s and their continuation are not just important for economic growth but the livelihood of a population who over the centuries, through custom and practice, have become dependant on them for agricultural production. As an indicator of the dependence of the Indian economy and peoples lives on Monsoon, the revenue targets for 2004-5 financial year were based on a projected growth of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 6 to 6.5% which are now uncertain because of the late arrival of the Monsoon and the extra spending needed for drought relief and a slow down in economic growth. Monsoon failure in India due to climate change would be catastrophic (Ahluwalia, 2007: 74).

One might argue that the climate change debate has no justification for a critique in India’s economic growth because the country’s per capita green house emissions contributing to climate change is 25 times less than the average of the United States and 15 times less than the European average. As the Indian Secretary for Ministry of Environment and Forests, Prodipto Ghosh has said (Chengappa, 2007: 41),

India is certainly not responsible for the mess.
We are in fact victims of it. So why expect us
to tighten our belts?


Unfortunately half a billion of India’s population could be affected by a loss in water supply and a forecasted sea level rise of 40 cm will create 50 million homeless people, not including, possible environmental refugees from Bangladesh, South Coast Pakistan and Eastern parts of coastal Burma. India’s emergence as a giant is dependent on how the Indian Government plans and prepares for climate change.

Colonial Influence
For thousands of years small-scale irrigation has been practiced in India and in the 19Th century British colonialists started major engineering works for agriculture in the landscape. Between 1836 and 1854 they built three large projects, developing the Upper Ganga Canal in Uttar Pradesh, the Upper Bari Doah Canal in Punjab and the Godavari Deta System in Andhra Pradesh, all to improve the mercantile economy and agricultural production of the colony (Fereidoun, G. 2007: 321).

However one of the most damaging legacies of British colonialism was to be the dispute over the Farraka Barrage on the Ganga River. The barrage diverts water into the Bhagirathi River with the intent of improving facilities at the port of Calcutta by flushing silt from the connecting lower reaches of the Hooghly River. The two tragic consequences of this project were to deprive East Pakistan/Bangladesh of valuable dry season water flows and create one myth of Indian malicious intent toward Bangladesh (Crow, 1995: 71).

Perhaps the major factor in the Farraka Barrage dispute is the multiple reports written only to allay fears over the viability of Calcutta’s port and the ignorance to comprehend the impacts on the geographic region. Between 1853 and 1952 there were 11 reports into the Hooghly, Bhagirathi and Ganga River impacts on Calcutta’s future as a harbour with the longest research, of 9 years, being conducted between 1896 and 1905. Two of these reports recommended relocating Calcutta’s harbour facilities (Crow, 1995: 35). One might argue that this indecision and poor leadership created a legacy of dispute, mistrust and resentment toward Calcutta’s inhabitants but it is difficult to believe that it was specifically created to agitate the future Bangladeshi Government because these political and environmental river machinations were commenced before partition of India and East Pakistan/Bangladesh. Unfortunately this realisation does not alleviate the hardship of the current population who endure an ongoing cycle of extreme flooding and drought exacerbated by water diversion to Calcutta.

Moreover one might argue that blaming the previous colonial masters for river problems of the present will not help India “emerge as a giant” but may explain the difficulty of being free of two scientific locations. Firstly the long term ecological management and conservation of river basins versus the economics and competition of food production, manufacturing, trade and commerce. Also contemporary Calcutta may have inherited an outlook of a Western European Metropolis from an enclave of euro-centric science that is intellectually divorced from the Bangladeshi landscape. Therefore hydrological science inherited from colonialists and applied in Calcutta may have failed to appreciate the need of the region over the needs of the city (Kumar, 2006: 8).

Furthermore language use and perception, such as the word “landscape,” a 16th century language import from the Dutch “lanschap,” defines "landscape" as a unit of human occupation or a jurisdiction with the ideal of reclaiming land from the sea and liberating from nature, a creation site of human culture, which may contribute to a Euro-centric outlook. Therefore the environmental history, in the example of the Farraka Barrage pertains to India inheriting the British colonial example of taking, exploiting and exhausting not only the landscape but also the traditional cultures through economic aggression rather than long-term ecological management(Schama, 1995: 13).

The wider implications of this attitude, perception or belief of the colonial inheritance of environmental exploitation is that “development” be it sustainable, economic or technological is not just associated with rivers but imperative for India as a “river landscape” because demand is outstripping the capacity for natural resources to fuel economic growth. Sustainable use of natural resources between the domains of environment, cultural protection and economic development could be achieved through public participation, inter-agency cooperation, national and local government coordination (Raman, 2007: 53).

One might argue it will be the response and cooperation of India’s government, business sector and population that will determine what kind of giant India will become. In 1948, just after Indian independence A. C. Egerton, in address to the Royal Society, (Kumar, 2006: 228) articulates a balanced approach to finding a way for India becoming a “giant;”

Do not be to attracted by all the glamour of western technology, it is wonderful but we in some ways have industrialised too far and not made the world happier thereby. You have a chance of distilling the best out of the West and fitting it into the age old civilisation of the East. If you can improve husbandry and the state of villagers with out going for too great a concentration of industry you may in the end gain greater happiness. The key note should be to copy and westernise but to fit the best of the new into the best of the old civilisation.

However one might argue that Edgerton’s speech is a softening of condemnation for the colonisation process to justify, legitimise and authorise European rule. At the beginning of the 21st century a lingering Euro-centric view of Indian engineering, hydrology and mathematics is argued by both British and Indian historians, that it was as at its best in ancient times and fell from grace during Mughal rule. But in reality these were reflections of the development of European science and technology from the dark ages, while Indian science came from waves of continuous and vigorous Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian manuscripts that were just not applied to industrialisation (Rahman, 1982; 20-21).

The British colonial era saw a major expansion in water storage, transfer and irrigation that as a legacy has continued and intensified since 1947. In the year 2000 India’s population reached 1.03 billion people with a forecast of it increasing to 1.8 billion by 2050. At present the average annual run off of water is 1800 cubic metres per person but by 2050 it will fall to 1000 cubic metres per person, suggesting that India is water stressed (Fereidoun, 2007: 342). Kates, (2005: 10) argues that India’s success at gaining national independence from the British and its aspiration of economic development to provide for the basic necessities to the poor has ignored or been blinded to the fact that the environment does not exist as a space separate from human actions, ambitions and needs. Moreover “development” has become an accusatory word used by former imperialists to dictate how poor nations should be governed to alleviate poverty. Emphatically the environment is where people live and development is what governments do to improve that abode and therefore the two become inseparable.

Inter-Basin Water Transfer
India’s dams have mostly been built for the purpose of irrigation and some for hydro power generation with half of the large projects built between 1970 and 1989. Most urban supplies of dam water feed the cities of Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad and Mumbai for industrial manufacture of steel, fertiliser and textiles. In India there are approximately 4291 dams higher than 10 metres and 2342 dams higher than 15 metres (Fereidoun, 2007: 323).

Table 1: Dams higher than 10 metres (Fereidoun, 2007: 323).

Province------------------------No.
Gujarat-------------------------537
Madhy Pradesh-------------------1093
Maharashtra---------------------1529
Other Provinces-----------------1132
Total---------------------------4291

An increasing population demanding more food and protection from drought, flooding and the consequences of climate change have made current dams inadequate for the needs of the population because of the imbalance of water availability across the country. However the west flowing rivers of Brahmaputra, Ganga/Maharati and Godavari have large storage's of water that could be transferred to water deficit areas for the development of irrigation, hydro-power generation, domestic and industrial water use (Fereidoun, 2007: 330).

The National River Linking Project is a plan to transfer water from the water rich northeast or Himalayan Rivers to the water poor, Peninsula Rivers in southwest of India. The Indian National Water Development Agency (INMDA) has been carrying out feasibility studies since 1982 with the concept included in the 1987 National Water Policy and reiterated in a 2002 policy statement. Recently in response to public interest litigation the Indian Supreme Court has ordered the Indian Government to complete the project within ten years and be fully operational by 2016. The project will transfer 173 billion cubic metres of water from the Ganga, Brahmaputra and Teesa Rivers through a series of canals, weirs, reservoirs and pipelines to the states of Utar Pradesh, Rajastan Maharashtra, Gujarat, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu at a cost of over $US 120 billion (Ahmad, 2003: 1).

Please right click on image for better view.

However Environment Impact Statements (EIA) in India are not reliable because of the lack of data for the different climatic zones, landscapes, culture and traditions that produce India's diversity of lifestyles, terrains, flora and fauna. No standard environmental information database exists because it is viewed as a complex, cumbersome and a time consuming exercise. EIA for development projects is presently seen as a project level instrument and does not address the programs at the policy and planning level (Ramman, 2007: 69). One might suggest that if EIA are not addressed at the policy level then the cultural, social and spiritual impacts will have consequences more immediate in antagonising the population to when construction attacks there personal beliefs and landscape. Moreover India's natural world will be decimated because of a lack of knowledge about the state of the environment.

Mega-Hydrological projects are not unique for development, nation building or as a panacea for water supply issues and problems. One might suggest they are a perquisite for “Emerging Giants.” Jawaharlal Nehru’s (Dixit, 2007: 1) proclamation of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai has a hydrological simile can be visualised through China’s Three Gorges Dam Project, the worlds biggest hydroelectric scheme on the Yangtze River in central China will build a dam wall 175 m high and 2.3 km long generating 18, 200 MW of electricity costing $US 30 billion. This will reduce China’s coal consumption by 40 million tonnes a year, the equivalent of 12 nuclear power stations. Flooding in the worst year on record, 1954 killed 30,000 people and the Three Gorges will mitigate most of this disaster event. However the reservoir is 630 km to 690 km long and just over a kilometre across and will inundate 13 cities, 140 towns and 1352 villages relocating 1.2 million people. Farmers will be forced to move to less fertile land losing productivity. Furthermore the sediment build up will be as far as the biggest river port in South West China, Chonqing. Like the proponents of the Indian River Linking project, Three Gorges Dam is decreed to have benefits that outweigh the severity of the human cost (Ball, 1999: 333-4).

One might suggest that “Western” critics are hypocritical when they venerate the achievements of their heritage, such as, 1st century AD Roman engineering of Nimes in Provence, France. Where the inhabitants decided they needed more water for their city than the landscape had available. Citizens spent 100 million sesterces building a massive symbol of human ingenuity. Near Uzes, north of Nimes, Roman engineers found a water source strong enough to irrigate the baths and fountains of their city and made plans to divert water 50 miles through mountains and across valleys in a system of aqueducts and underground pipes. When engineers came to the cavernous gorge of the Gad River they erected a 3 tiered aqueduct, 360 metres long, 48 metres high, capable of carrying 35,000 cubic metres of water a day, so the inhabitants of Nimes would not have to suffer the indignity of a shallow bath (de Botton, 2000: 106).

The construction of the National River Linking Project has serious consequences for the people of India when it inundates 8, 000 square kilometres of fertile land and displaces 3 million people. Unlike the Chinese and Roman examples the Indian project has international dilemmas because the scale of the construction has unknown environmental and economic outcomes for neighbouring Bangladesh and Nepal. Moreover the construction of Mega-Dams in the Himalayan Mountains risks the triggering of earthquakes in a seismically active region. Also dams will reduce the flow of sediment loads of the Ganga and Bramhaputra River which carry an average of 1.7-2.4 x 109 tonnes per year to an Indian and Bangladeshi river delta with an area of 20, 000 km2. Dams would trap sediment upstream with impacts on fisheries, forestry, coastline stability and a social cost for people who depend on these areas for their livelihood (Fereidoun, 2007: 336).

Gender
From a feminist perspective, one might argue, that the building of large-scale projects such as the National River Linking Project does not adequately address the needs of women and family members who would benefit more from small scale targeted programs. In natural disasters such as flooding, women are more affected than men because they are restricted to the home with responsibilities of an extended family. Social or cultural objections often mean that women have never learned to swim or engaged in physical play that would give them skills in climbing and running to escape the impacts of natural disasters. Indian clothing fashion, saris and long garments hamper the movement when carrying young children, babies or assisting the infirm. Women carry the responsibility of giving birth, caring for children, the sick and elderly. During disasters and construction projects when male members of the family are absent, the risk of a break down in law and order increases the risk of women as victims in exploitive behaviours. Loss of employment or a partner can result in sexual harassment and a reliance on prostitution for food or a livelihood and in developing regions one of the few opportunities to avert poverty (FOCUS, 2007: 31).

The focus on women’s issues pertaining to their life dependant on a river and water development may provide an alternative to building a massive dam project. A micro personal empowerment project would achieve similar outcomes for the population and allow people to work with the landscape instead of trying to change it for human consumption. Emergency preparation, disaster readiness, the teaching of boat/raft handling techniques, as well as swimming, rescue skills and first aid are methods that can enrich communities and benefit the country by increasing the skill base and adaptability of its citizens. Moreover flood proofing, design; mobile health clinics and limited relocation add flexibility to natural disaster areas. It could be argued that innovation in cultural expectations and female empowerment would help people in water troubled areas to adapt to their conditions rather than attempting to change the landscape with mega engineering project. The choice India can make as an emerging giant is to either invest in mega-engineering projects or in the knowledge enterprise and resourcefulness of its citizens (FOCUS, 2007: 31).

Spiritual Impacts
In spite of the diversity of landscape and culture in Indian traditions, one might argue there is an overriding belief and respect for religious values relating to wealth, beauty, longevity, health, food, love and children and the association of these values with rivers. Simon Schama (1995: 13-15) argues that national and cultural identities would lose their captivation if they did not have the mysticism of the associated landscape and a traditional topography that is elaborately mapped as a “homeland.” One might argue that rivers are such a dynamic part of a landscape that one can understand their mystical veneration.
Religious leaders deal with ecological change by separating the domains of Hinduism and science. Hinduism is not necessarily opposed to the differences between modernity and tradition but incorporate them into the argument. These two domains are so specialised that that they do not converge, which minimilises but does not eliminate ideological conflict (Alley, 2000: 378) Rivers are created by the merging of a multitude of tiny streams and rivulets that are sometimes dry and with no immediate obvious source. But whether they are minor or major, most have a particular spot that is identified as a spiritual or magical source, which becomes a site of worship and pilgrimage. This cultural construction of the landscape is usually accepted as tradition and the “source spot” becomes the location of temples, tanks, steps and structures to facilitate pilgrim visits (Feldhaus, 1995: 21).

India has relatively abundant water but rivers and urban supplies have become highly polluted and most of the population does not have basic sanitation systems or access to clean water and consequently dysentery, cholera, typhoid and hepatitis become health care burdens rather than just issues. Water in nature does have the ability to clean itself and modern inputs of organic waste, rotting vegetables, excrement and even crude oil, can be biodegraded by bacteria, consumed and metabolised and passed along the biogeochemical cycle in the landscape. Most components of domestic sewage may persist for only days to weeks in the environment but self-cleansing has its limits (Ball. 1999: 324). It is difficult to comprehend how Indian society could fail to understand the burden of polluted water but people have acquired this mystical belief in water, on the one hand and solid waste on the other that overwhelms the landscape with pollution. In India, water is considered the universal cleanser, whose rivers and lakes are the most contaminated in the world yet are accorded a supernatural quality of purification (Ball, 1999: 325).

Religious practitioners make a distinction between purity and cleanliness when considering waste water having an impact on people and the environment. For instance the “Mother Ganga” could become unclean but she could never be impure. Spiritually the river Ganga is a Goddess who possesses the power to absorb and absolve human and worldly impurities and can stave off the degenerating contempt of Indian societies without defiling herself. Water pollution through spiritual acts of purity, fertility and worship by ablution is a counter argument to government criticism. Water health programs and accusatory officials are claimed by religious leaders and gurus that they are the ones who actually create the pollution they claim to control because of corruption and inefficiency (Alley, 2000:358).

Separate domains of action exist in the population where Indian Government departments administer resource development and management through the judiciary and political enforcement. Litigious rules and regulations with the consequent fines and penalties supposedly control navigation, fisheries, dams, water extraction and natural disaster response. However religious institutions, sectarian organizations, temple committees and trusts although not legally recognised are respected by the population as a moral truth. Moreover religious practice uses ablutions, meditations and worship from sacred texts, folk and oral narratives that teach empower and obligate a person to enter a sacred place. But unlike the government officials, priests and holy men do not punish people for their transgressions but teach and direct them through spiritual practice and ritual (Alley, 2000: 378).

Conversely religious practice and precedent can inhibit and restrain development solutions. For instance, Ahluwalia (2005: 59) argues that a major decline in public saving of 1.7% of GDP in 1996-7 to -2.7% 2001-2002 is because the government borrowed money to finance fiscal deficits from expenses in food and fertiliser subsidies, which resulted in a budgetary burden of 1.4% in 2002-2003. Ironically in rural areas where fertiliser is in demand, human excrement is flushed away with gallons of water rather than composted for its nutrients. Indian’s can spread animal dung in a garden or burn it for stove fires but their own excrement induces such revulsion when it can be composted into dark crumbly fertiliser within a year (Ball, 1999: 325).

Conclusion
India is a country, state or nation defined by its river basins and water is a public policy, economic development and spiritual issue that will have impacts for many years into the future. How India manages its fresh water and the populations’ response to water issues will determine whether it will be a giant civilisation, just another giant or a giant problem. Its river basin’s are not only catchments of precipitation or Monsoon but social, cultural and political needs and challenges of highland, lowland urban and rural citizens. Planning for climate change and associated sea level rise needs to start now even though the West is responsible for the problem and hypocritically denigrates developing countries for not modernising by “Western” standards! India will only be a giant if it survives and prospers after this global environmental change.

As A.C. Egerton (Kumar, 2006: 228) says, India’s colonial history and legacy can be an asset to its development as a giant because it adds to the diverse richness of its culture, which should be unifying, rather than a divisive force. Dam building and the National River Linking Project need further study and careful examination because of the lack of a comprehensive environmental and cultural information database. So too the building of mega infrastructure in a seismically sensitive area of the Himalayas needs careful planning even if this hinders economic development. Better to mitigate adversity at first than add to a development burden through creating or contributing to natural disasters.

Big development projects, such as dam building, are not only aspirational for India but are the nationalistic goals created impart by precedents and pressures in the global community of prestige and “giant building” as evidenced by the distant and recent historical precedents of civilisations 1st century Roman, Nimes and the modern day Chinese State. Mega development projects such as dams could be replaced by a shift in attitude toward women’s needs by empowering and training them to cope with natural diasters such as flooding and finding new ways to survive and prosper in the river basin landscape. This type of training would raise the skill level and adaptability of the population and India could become a giant through investing in the skills of its population, especially the wasted talents of its female citizenry, rather than constructing new built landscapes.

Indian government and officials have a major challenge in “winning the hearts and minds” of its citizens when compared to the religious gurus who are resident in the community they influence. These Gurus do not punish with litigious fines and imprisonment but teach and encourage through religious practice and ritual. This gives religious leaders and not government organizations a greater moral authority in the eyes of the population. If India can merge the two domains of government management and spiritual encouragement then perhaps it will be a giant never seen before.

Selected References.
Ahluwalia, I. J. 2005, Indian Economy: New Pathways to Growth and Development, in Indian Briefing: Take Off at Last, Ayres, A. and Oldenburg, P. editors, pp 45-79, M. E. Sharpe Publishers, New York.
Alam, B. 2007, Application in Water Supply Project: Case of Karnataka, in Environment Impact Assessment: an Indo-Australian Perspective, pp. 256-275, Ta’i, B. Murphy, P. and Rana, P. S. editors, Bookwell, New York.
Alley, K.D. 2000, Separate Domains: Hinduism, Politics and Environmental Pollution, in Hinduism and Ecology; the interaction of earth, sky and water, pp. 355-388, Chapple, C. K. and Tucker, M. E. editors, Harvard University Press, Harvard.
Ball, P. 1999, H2O: A Biography of Water, Phoenix Publishing, London.
Crow, B. 1995, Sharing the Ganges, The Politics and Technology of River Development, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
Davie, T. 2003, Fundamentals of Hydrology, Routledge, London.
de Botton, A. 2000, Consolations of Philosophy, Penguin Books, London.
Feldhaus, A. 1995, Water and Womanhood – Religious meanings of Rivers in Maharastra, Oxford University Press, New York.
Fereidoun, G. and White I. 2007, Inter-Basin Water Transfer, Case Studies from Australia, United States, Canada, China and India, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Kumar, D. 2006, Science and the Raj; A Study of British India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Rahman, A. 1982, Medieval India: A Bibliography of Source Materials in Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian, New Delhi.
Raman, N. S. 2007, Environment Impact Assessments (EIA): Status in India, in Environment Impact Assessment: an Indo-Australian Perspective, pp. 59-75, Ta’i, B. Murphy, P. and Rana, P. S. editors, Bookwell, New York.
Schama, S. 1995, Landscape and Memory, Vintage Books, New York.
Chengappa, R. “Apocalypse Now,” India Today, April 23, 2007, pp. 38-44.
FOCUS “Gender: Mother Load,” The Magazine of Australia’s Overseas Aid Program, Volume 22, No. 2, May-August 2007, pg. 31.
Kates, R. W. “What is Sustainable Development? Goals, Indicators, Values and Practice, Environment Magazine, Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Volume 47, No. 3, April 2005, Heldreff Publications, pp. 9-21.
Dixit, J.N. Ultimate Idealist: Jawaharlal Nehru,
www.india-today.com/itody/millennium/100people/nehru.html
visited May 2007.

Saturday

Timor Leste's Magellan


The independence struggle of the people of East Timor is an inspiration and an example to every one, on the decent, inclusive and responsible process of achieving self-determination. Edward Said (1994; 62-3) has commented that often leaders of liberation movements are seduced by anti-colonial nationalism whose programme and mechanisms result in the replication of the exploitive behaviour of their former colonial masters. Jose Ramos-Horta as one of the key leaders of independence has built a good political foundation through dialogue, openness and intelligibility, which will hopefully prevent East Timor suffering Said’s fate. For the leaders of the region who promote Asian values, East Timor’s political ethic is a contrast that shames their efforts in governance of the people they liberated from colonial rule. Many academics are pessimistic about the survival of East Timor economically and politically but one might suggest that this was the argument first used to justify Indonesian invasion.

Jose Manuel Ramos-Horta is a modern day political Magellan whose diplomatic navigation and commitment to peaceful resistance helped found the world’s newest nation-state. His star, shines no less brightly when commentators like Mike Smith (2003: 39) suggest that a history of the East Timorese diaspora will reveal the biographies of greater hero’s of the independence movement. There is some merit in Mike Smith’s opinion especially in cases like the life of Martinho di Costa Lopes who has been described as “the fighting spirit” of East Timor. But Jose Ramos-Horta was instrumental in rousing the world to his cause by using pen, voice and discourse.

This essay illustrates the life of Ramos-Horta and how he became one of the key figures in the East Timor independence movement. His life appears to be a progression of diplomatic training starting with his home and the influences of the experience of his family. The schools he went to and what they taught. It also reflects on his life as a fledgling journalist and his exile in Mozambique. It discuses how the United Nations (U.N.) taught Ramos-Horta to be a diplomat and political lobbyist. That the turning point for East Timorese resistance came with the Santa Cruz massacre and the implication that Ramos-Horta and the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN) had let the world go to sleep over East Timor. It illustrates that the award of the Nobel Peace Prize while a personal triumph built momentum for a U.N. sponsored referendum and eventual independence of East Timor. Ramos-Horta’s answers to his critic’s and standing in the world community are discussed and how his life and achievements have brought legitimacy and authority to his counsel and opinion.

In the 1950’s and 60’s of East Timor, where Jose Manuel grew up, the island was largely a forgotten colony of the Portuguese Empire whose government was more interested in the retention of its resource rich African colonies than a remote island between Australia and Indonesia. However East Timor was useful as a training ground for Catholic priests or most often as a convenient place to exile criminals and opponents to the Salazar regime. These “Deportados” included Jose Manuel’s grandfather, an anarchist, who was deported to Cape Verde, later to East Timor and his father, a Petty Officer in the Portuguese Navy, who organised a rebellion to help the socialist side in the Spanish Civil War (Dunn, 2003: 11).

One might argue that Jose Manuel continued the family tradition with deportation to Mozambique and later, with 23 years of exile from Indonesian occupation but he did use his time more productively, surpassing his fathers in his revolutionary ambitions. Along with the Catholic Church the Deportados indirectly influenced the ruling elites of East Timor when they married local women and became coffee growers or farmers developing a close affinity with the Timorese. The Deportados often supported local grievances with officials, lobbied the administration for assistance in adverse areas, helped Australian commandos in 1942, and sometimes passed on their political ideas of socialism and democracy to the Timor educated elites (Dunn, 2003: 12).

Although the Deportados were a colourful part of Timorese society Jose Manuel was not directly influenced in his political ambitions by his father’s exploits. Only when he visited other Portuguese colonies and met some of his father’s comrades did he learn of his fathers “good old days” during the Spanish Civil War (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 7). One might speculate that the reputation and contacts of Ramos-Horta’s grandfather and father initially and maybe unknowingly gained him access to people and places that aided his ambitions for East Timor, especially with Portuguese anti-colonial movements. It is also surprising that the Portuguese or Indonesians did not use the “criminal” history of his family as part of a smear campaign when Jose Manuel became more politically popular. Of his father Horta (1987: 7) says:
“Father hardly never talked to any of us. He was a quiet, withdrawn man whose most faithful companion was a short-wave radio with tall bamboo antennas that enabled him to monitor Lisbon and the BBC.”

Perhaps his mother Natalina was more of an inspiration to her son as a role model because of her survival of the Japanese occupation of WWII. Natalina’s immediate and distant family were all killed by the Japanese except a sister who now lives in Lisbon and all the people of her village were either burnt alive in their houses or shot while trying to escape (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 5). After four years at the United Nations (U.N.) Jose Manuel received information that the Indonesians had captured Natalina, and he learnt of the death of two of his brothers: Guy and Nuna and his sister Mariazinha. The first message Jose Manuel received from his Mother after four years of silence was:

“Don’t give up, your comrades are still fighting in the mountains”

Fortunately Natalina was able to come to Australia through efforts of one of her other sons Arsenio who became an Australian citizen in the early 1970’s and now lives in the Sydney suburb of Liverpool a convenient base for Jose Manuel’s diplomatic efforts in Australia (Zubrycki, 2002 & Ramos-Horta, 1987: 5).

One might argue that Zubrycki’s documentary film “The Diplomat” illustrates just how politically astute Natalina is through her narrative and outspoken nature which perhaps Jose Manuel inherited from her rather than his father. But the most poignant example of Natalina’s character is her commentary in the book, Inside Out, East Timor (Ross, 1999: 14) where she says:

“Some people say I am a good person but others say I have a big mouth. But I am a person who does not like lies and I say what I think I should say. Whether people like me or not the truth should be spoken and not hidden.”

When he was seven years old Jose Manuel was sent to the Mission School at Soibada the oldest school in Timor and probably the best or maybe, only decent primary education available on the island. Hundreds of students came from across Timor, especially the children of elite families and included some scholarship winners. Unfortunately schools of this type have their dark side. Firstly the remoteness meant that for seven years Ramos-Horta was separated from his family and secondly the attentions of a Master Jaimie who took a sadistic delight in beating boys unconscious, a fate Jose Manuel did not escape when he was caught speaking in Tetum rather than Portuguese (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 9).

One might speculate that one the reasons the present government insists on having Portuguese as an official language may have its roots in the leaders early education many of whom went to the Soibada Mission School. There is no commentary on whether students were sexually assaulted but Ramos-Horta alludes to it in his book Funu (1987: 9) where he mentioned that Master Jamie appeared to gain sexual gratification from beating young children. One might argue that for at least some of the independence leadership the cruelty of the Soibada Mission was an early motivator in the desire for a better and independent East Timor.

Jose Manuel had an easier time when he went to high school at the Lyceum in Dili, unlike most of the male Timorese elite who went to the Dare Seminary. Here Jose mixed with other ethnic groups and especially girls rather than just the male children of the elite. It was in his final year at the Lyceum that he started to work as a journalist for the newspaper the “Voice of Timor.” Jose also attended meetings of an informal nationalist group, consisting mostly of office workers and high school students, organised by a Lisbon University graduate Leonel Andrade. They met in the park outside the Governor’s office in Dili, in full view of passers by, so as not to attract the attention of International State Defence Police (PIDE) (Hill, 2002: 52).

One night in Dili, late in 1970, at the age of 18, Jose Manuel fell in with a group of carousing Australians only to get drunk and make several subversive statements, which PIDE agents overheard and recorded. His arrest and interrogation resulted in his deportation to Mozambique. PIDE were ever-present, powerful, hated and feared by everyone. Even after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, its power to arrest and torture remained undiminished (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 6).

The extended Ramos-Horta family and almost the whole town, except his father who was ill at the time and died a few months later, came to see him off at the Dili dock where a troop ship had docked. Dressed in his first suit, under the supervision of the authorities he embarked to be a journalist with a local newspaper in Maputo. Unfortunately, this job in Mozambique did not last long because the editor of the newspaper, a priest, fired him for dating one of his secretaries. Ramos-Horta later learned that the girl was the priest’s lover (Hill, 2002: 64).

Hill (2002: 65) suggests that Ramos-Horta’s exile to Mozambique was a “set-up” so he could make contact with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) but the record of his experiences are only cursory even in his book Funu. Hill (2002: 65) suggests what impacted Ramos-Horta in Mozambique was the repressiveness of the colonial regime and the contradictions in government policy through claims of non-discrimination when apartheid existed on the beaches, buses and in restaurants. Also Ramos-Horta was frustrated by the heavy censorship of his articles about the military action and in 1972, when he was conscripted for military service he refused to enlist and fortunately, maybe by design, was deported back to East Timor.

Mozambique was a good training experience and insight for Ramos-Horta’s later efforts in East Timor against both Portugal and Indonesia. He saw first hand the military and political consequences of violent anti-colonial resistance from both sides and made contacts that were later to benefit members of FRETILIN. It could be suggested that the violence and bloodshed in Mozambique was one of the determinant factors in Ramos-Horta’s future peaceful and political resistance strategies. Moreover one might suggest that indirect evidence for Ramos-Horta’s networking resulted in links between FRETILIN and FRELIMO illustrated by their shelter of Mari Alkatiri and Roger Lobato after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. Also President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique was a special guest at Ramos-Horta’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony and the adoption of the Mozambique constitution for newly independent East Timor is further evidence of the friendship and ideological links between FRETILIN and FREMLO (Ramos-Horta, 1996: 9).

When Ramos-Horta’s returned to East Timor he got his old job back writing for the “Voice of Timor” and a new Catholic Church weekly paper called SEARA edited by Martinho di Costa Lopes, soon to be the Bishop of Dili. Lopes was a mature and experienced counsel not only to Ramos-Horta but many FRETILIN, UDT and APODETI leaders because he knew most of them from time as a teacher at the Dare Seminary. Lopes’ passion for education and care for his students is illustrated by his later efforts of supplying philosophy books to resistance leader Xanana Gusmao who was fighting in the mountains during Indonesian occupation (Lennox, 2000: 104).
But back in 1972, SEARA was the public forum for emerging leaders such as Nicolau Lobato, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Manuel Carrascalao, Domingos de Olivera, Francisco Borja da Costa and Mari Alkitiri who later became the leaders of both sides of politics and sometimes violent opponents. Lopes threw out many anonymous articles submitted to SEARA arguing that if the authors could not take responsibility for their words their work did not deserve publication. But given the brutality of the PIDE he did not mind authors submitting articles under a pseudonym as long as he new their real identity (Lennox, 2000: 85 & Dunn, 2003: 33).

When Lopes lost his position as Bishop of Dili in 1985, Ramos-Horta was the only one he confided to about the Vatican pressure he endured and his forced resignation for his anti-Indonesian opinions. The Vatican were more concerned with the five the million Catholics in Indonesia who may have been victims of an Indonesian backlash if they supported the Timorese. Despite this apparent sacrifice of Timorese Catholics Lopes did not want the Timorese to fell badly about the Pope. Ramos-Horta took welcome time off from the U.N. and they watched boxing all day on the television. At the award ceremony for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, Ramos-Horta donated his share of the prize money to a charity foundation named in Martinho di Costa Lopes’ honour (Lennox, 2000: 215 & Ramos-Horta, 1996: 13).

Ramos-Horta’s article Maubere in the 24th of March issue of SEARA caused a lot controversy that gave PIDE the excuse to close the paper down and Lopes had to endure a lot of community anger despite his efforts to tone down Horta’s article by using the teachings of Jesus as a parallel. In Tetum the word Maubere was used as an insult to anyone who is poor and ignorant but Horta wanted to use Maubereism as a cultural tool for political empowerment. The Maubere of East Timor were a once proud people who farmed collectively and shared their crops, elected Chiefs who called assemblies to make decisions. Moreover the Maubereism that Horta and his political supporters were trying to promote was a philosophy, which sought to consider how to get the common people to be literate, free from poverty and other social injustices. Mauberiesm in the Horta sense had similarities with popularist ideology of third world anti-colonialism especially their African counterparts (Hill, 2002: 74 & Lennox, 2000: 86).

Only the political and administrative turmoil of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal saved Ramos-Horta from deportation but fear of government reaction hardly slowed his efforts to improve Timorese lives. Early in 1974 he organised a strike for builders labourers in Dili who were getting AUS$10/month and were asking for a wage rise when they got the sack. The employers complained to the government saying Ramos-Horta was a reactionary and Lisbon sent two officials to Timor on a fact-finding mission. When they discovered that Ramos-Horta an was activist against the former Salazar government they gave the workers a hundred percent wage increase and helped them organise a union (Hill, 2002: 69).

One of the major published critics of Ramos-Horta has been the East Timor Student Movement (ETSM) based at the University of Yogyakarta. They are largely supporters of Jose Osorio Soares the founder and later president of the Popular Democratic Association of Timor (APODETI), who wanted integration with Indonesia. Soares was a Portuguese colonial official who lost his colonial posting because of rape allegations and three years later was fired because of fraud charges, which he claimed were manufactured because of his Indonesian sympathies. Ramos-Horta also believed Soares was “set up” and invited him to the first FRETILIN meeting which he attended but never joined because his political mentor the Indonesian Consul in Dili, E.M. Tomodok, advised him not to deviate from a straight forward pro-Indonesia platform (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 32).

ETSM accuses Ramos-Horta of being inconsistent and a political opportunist because of FRETILIN’s boycott of the Macau meetings sponsored by the Portuguese Government at which independence issues were to be discussed. ETSM argues that Ramos-Horta deprived the East Timorese of their rights to self-determination by declaring independence after the August, 1975 coup by the coalition of the Democratic Union of Timor (UDT) and APODETI. Moreover ETSM accuses FRETILIN of starting a program of censorship of other political views. Ramos-Horta declared to international journalists that although FRETILIN was an independence movement not a political party they were not against a multiparty system. What FRETELIN did preclude were people or parties who wanted annexation and not independence from other countries (Mota, 1997: 63 & Hill, 2002: 93).

Despite Ramos-Horta’s continued assertion that he opposed some of FRETILIN’s domestic policies ETSM points out that he was FRETILIN’s most outspoken campaigner for independence on the international circuit, which smothered the Indonesian pro-integration message. Moreover, Ramos-Horta as one of the main leaders of FRETILIN was self appointed rather than elected and therefore not a legitimate representative of the East Timor people. Furthermore FRETILIN allowed the abuse of human rights and instituted a regime of terror by forcing 40,000 East Timorese to flee to the Indonesian border regions to escape FRETILIN violence and stand over tactics (Mota, 1997: 64).

Ramos-Horta agrees that FRETILIN’s boycott of the Macau meetings was politically costly and provided propaganda to the opposition opinion of FRETILIN as a group of communist radicals. But Nicolau Lobato, the president of FRETILIN, insisted that any talks about independence would be fruitless with APODETI’s presence because they only represented Indonesian interests. Unfortunately Ramos-Horta was in Canberra at the time and had to explain to the international press why FRETILIN did not attend the talks and admits he had no intelligent explanation (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 53).

The civil war that followed the August, 1975 coup attempt, resulted in atrocities from both sides losing control of the behaviour of their supporters. On returning to Dili in the second week in September, 1975, Ramos–Horta saw many scenes of violence not least of which was his imprisoned brother Arsenio, who was an Australian citizen, had returned to Timor for a short visit, against Ramos-Horta’s advice, and was mistaken for a UDT member, beaten up and put in jail. At Ramos-Horta’s persistent urging, Nicolau Lobato had most of the opposition prisoners released and for those that remained a stop to the beatings (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 56).

One might suggest that Ramos-Horta did have a responsibility for the behaviour of the supporters of FRETILIN, as one of their key leaders but his absence from the domestic scene for foreign relation issues excuses him from some of the blame. As foreign relations representative of FRETILIN he did admit his mistake in not going to the Macau conference ten years before the ETSM publication in his book Funu. It might also be argued that the atrocities showed FRETILIN’s inexperience at governing and administering the newly independent colony. Moreover, one might argue that ETSM’s publication is more in response to Ramos-Horta winning the Nobel Peace prize rather than a legitimate political debate. ETSM’s support and praise for Bishop Carlos Belo rather than Ramos-Horta, who was the co winner of the Nobel Peace prize, could be argued as support for his status as an Indonesian citizen, which he did not renounce at East Timor’s independence.

Ramos-Horta’s effort to prevent Indonesian invasion of East Timor was tireless on the diplomatic front and he secured many concessions from the Indonesians. In 1974 Ramos-Horta met with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Adam Malik who gave him a letter outlining his welcomed prospect for an independent East Timor. This letter was received with triumph when Ramos-Horta returned to Dili but although the FRETILIN leadership were encouraged by Malik’s comments and reassurance, Ramos-Horta was not reassured because the real power in Indonesian foreign affairs in belonged to the military and General Ali Murtopo (Dunn, 2003: 50-3).

Ramos-Horta had been received coolly in Australia in July of 1974 and was unable to meet the Foreign Minister or even the department head. Ramos-Horta believed Australia was the key to any independence moves by FRETILIN because Australia was the only country in the region that could prevent Indonesia from invading. Ramos–Horta hoped that the Whitlam Government would give strong support to decolonisation but the stalling tactics filled Ramos-Horta with dread. Fortunately he was able to meet with opposition, church leaders and other community groups who could only provide verbal encouragement (Hill, 2002: 54).

Ramos-Horta’s continued desperate shuttle diplomacy between Jakarta, Canberra and Dili could not prevent accusations against himself and FRETILIN as communists, neo-Marxists and him personally as a power hungry pragmatist. This did not discourage his efforts, as his historical record can testify. Ramos-Horta was ever open to dialogue and negotiation (Dunn, 2003: 53). But one must argue that for many of the politicians in the region, who met the 22-year-old Horta, he must have appeared brash, provincial and idealistic. Many government leaders of the region had survived or grown up during WWII and had fought their own independence battles. It is disappointing that no one appeared to have the empathy to negotiate in earnest with this young and inexperienced politician who must have been a younger reflection of many government officials of the time.

In August 1974 he was finally able to meet the Australian Foreign Minister Don Willesee who assured Ramos-Horta that Australia would be favourable to requests for scholarships, training and facilities for East Timorese students who wished to study in Australia (Hill, 2002: 116). But one might argue that this offer was another stalling tactic or pacifying talk to humour a passionate young man. Moreover the political paranoia in the region after the United States withdrawal from Vietnam fuelled the theory that communist countries would create a “domino effect” of toppling neighbouring governments. In hindsight this appear an insecure attitude especially when an anti-communist Catholic church had dominated the East Timorese in their education. But conversely when the leaders of FRETILIN are seen in the context of the fashion of the time, the young radicals one might suggest had an image problem that they either could not address or were not change.

Ramos-Horta, Alkatiri and Niklolau Lobato’s brother Roger left Dili on December the 4th, 1975 to try and raise support for FRETILIN from other Portuguese speaking countries and at the United Nations (U.N.). While they were in the air on the way to Lisbon, Indonesia invaded Timor. When Ramos-Horta finally arrived in New York, on December the 8th it was snowing, something he had only seen on Christmas cards or Church decorations but any romantic notions were lost when the driver from the permanent mission of Guinea-Bissau checked his hotel room for wires or bombs. This was the welcome to a lifestyle and mission of the next 23 years of exile (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 102).

As one of the youngest members of the U.N. Ramos-Horta was lonely and desperate for news, especially about his family, and what news did emerge varied between Indonesian use of napalm in air strikes and people starving during evacuations. His time in New York between 1975 and 1989 was spent with days at the U.N. and to support himself financially he worked nights as a security guard at a local school. He also managed to fit in a Masters degree in Peace Studies between his shuttle diplomacy between Lisbon, New York and Canberra (Zubrycki: 2002, Hill, 2002: 43). One might argue that Ramos-Horta’s time at the U.N. did more for Timorese liberation than any other single factor in the independence struggle. He succeeded where others like the Dalai Lama and Aung San Su Xyi have failed because the U.N. was a training ground in world affairs and where he learned to be the political opportunist that Mota (1997: 63) and others often claim. Ramos–Horta may not have had immediate access to the super powers and “the movers and shakers” of world affairs but along with the support of other small nations like Vanuatu, Guinea-Bissau and Seychelles he watched and learnt the art of diplomacy. At the U.N. Ramos-Horta also learnt to soften his image or at least appear more “diplomatic” through his dress sense and demeanour. Comparing the image of the 1975 young man dressed in camouflage clothing, NATO helmet and “Che Guevara” style beard he looked very much the communist revolutionary contrasted with the collarless black suit -almost priest like- or the dapper bow tied designer label “show off” of a sophisticated rather than confrontational person (Zubrycki: 2002).

Ramos-Horta’s first speech to the U.N. related East Timor's historical desire for self-determination through the earlier wars of Covalima in 1719, Cova Cotubaba in 1868, Manufahi in 1912, struggles against the Japanese and more recently the Portuguese (Hill, 2002: 43). One might argue that the U.N. did not respond to Horta’s first pleas because this appeal to the past was a repeated tactic of so many decolonising nations. Contrasted with his Noble Peace Prize acceptance speech, which outlined a seven-year autonomy plan it showed, how refined Ramos-Horta’s oratory and FRETILIN’s plans had improved. The Nobel Prize acceptance speech illustrated how skilled a political navigator Ramos-Horta had become.

Unfortunately, Ramos-Horta’s improving skills and softening image were still unable to get Australian government policy onside, when he visited Bill Hayden, the Australian Foreign Minister in the Hawke Government, in 1985. FRETILIN was suggesting that they would be willing to negotiate without any pre-conditions if the U.N. were to supervise. But Hayden declined to get involved with any moves that would jeopardise a strengthening relationship with Indonesia. Australia appeared to “lock out” any FRETILIN efforts to free East Timor and Ramos-Horta had to persevere with the U.N. and Portugal (Lennox, 2000: 14).

The political turning point for East Timor came with the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre in Dili in 1991 when the Indonesian Army shot Timorese protesters and members of the international press during a peaceful demonstration. For the first time people in the West were able to see the brutality of the Indonesian Army on their television news reports. Ramos-Horta blamed himself for allowing the world to go to sleep on the issue of East Timor but one has to argue that this was the political and diplomatic opportunity that started the momentum for autonomy that FRETILIN had long hoped for (Zubrycki: 2002).

Unfortunately FRETILIN received another shock in 1991 when the Indonesians captured Xanana Gusmao while visiting Dili. With Xanana’s imprisonment in Jakarta it meant that Ramos-Horta was the only remaining public figure that could organise the coordination of both FRETILIN’s political and armed wings. But Ramos-Horta for the first time was able to unite all the resistance parties of East Timor into a new political front called the National Council Of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) (Lennox, 2000: 18).

One might argue that Horta was rehashing his political ideas that he wrote about in the article that closed down the SEARA newspaper in 1974. But the Santa Cruz massacre along with Ramos-Horta’s persuasive powers must have convinced groups like the UDT that they could no longer fight the Indonesians alone. This was also an excellent political tactic by Horta because by calling the new front Maubere he was now highlighting not only the political but also ethnic and cultural differences between the Timorese and Indonesians.

In 1992 CNRM launched a ten-year peace plan that talked of autonomy with Indonesia but not independence. This Peace Plan became a major part of Ramos-Horta’s acceptance speech at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, which also highlighted the plight of other prisoner’s conscience and many peoples trying to survive oppression around the world (Ramos-Horta, 1996: 15, 18). One might argue that Ramos–Horta’s skills as a diplomat were highlighted at this speech because his appeal on behalf of world minorities gave the East Timorese cause global categorization and an element of morality to their struggle.

Possibly CNRM’s more powerful friends may have told Ramos-Horta that they would arrange for someone from East Timor to receive the Peace Prize, possibly Xanana because he was in similar circumstance to former laureate Aung San Su Xyi, so that their autonomy plan had greater impact. To some readers this may seem fanciful but when Ramos-Horta met United States (U.S.) President Bill Clinton at the APEC meeting in New Zealand in 1999, Clinton remarked that Ramos-Horta had more influence with Congress than he did (Zubrycki: 2002). The Nobel Peace Prize helped gather momentum for CNRM and when the Asian financial crisis brought the resignation of Suharto in Indonesia Ramos-Horta and CNRM increased their pressure on Indonesia, Australia and the U.S. Ramos-Horta was in daily contact with Xanana in prison -through Kirsty Sword’s smuggling of a mobile phone and spare batteries- and along with other CNRM members would have daily conferences on their political strategies (Cheshire, 2002: 4).

Ramos-Horta’s status, authority and confidence was at its height in 1998 when he was part of a U.N. sponsored series of talks at Krumbach Castle in Austria with many of the attendees being pro-Indonesian supporters and only a handful of CNRM representatives. Ironically all the participants at the conference spoke Portuguese –not Indonesian, which possibly indicates that Indonesia nationalism had failed to include even the pro-integration leaders- and had grew up and gone to school together making this gothic setting surreal. Ramos-Horta’s basic stance was that Indonesia must withdraw its army from Timor and release all political prisoners. This was the fourth meeting of its kind and domed to fail because the Indonesian army would not withdraw from Timor let alone release Xanana (Zubrycki: 2002).

Ramos-Horta walked out of the talks without consulting anyone and told the international press that the pro-integration representatives were (Zubrycki: 2002):
“puppets and shit comes out of their mouths”
One might argue that this was a stage-managed controversial action to send a message to the Indonesian government but also it illustrates Ramos-Horta’s authority as a Nobel Peace Prize winner that he could sacrifice any good will from Indonesia or international community. Moreover he told the international press that he would rather be on a beach somewhere with Sharon Stone speaking about philosophy than negotiating a settlement with Indonesian officials (Zubrycki: 2002).

This excellent piece of rhetoric identifies with people on several levels. Firstly, that most people would rather go to the beach than work or that his opponents had no sexual prowess because they could not talk to women. Secondly, Ramos-Horta was connecting with the masses because it reminded everyone of the recent controversy in the movie Basic Instinct, a scene in which Sharon Stone uncrossed her legs, during police interrogation, to show she was not wearing any under wear. Perhaps, Ramos-Horta was using the symbolism of Sharon Stone’s performance to attack Indonesian bullying on one level and their sexuality on another.

However Ramos-Horta continues to draw criticism without any harm to his image and recently the East Timor Solidarity Activists (ETSA) in the U.S.A. responding to his article in the International Herald Tribune on 13th of September, 2001 expressing their regret in Ramos-Horta’s depiction of Arabs and Muslims as hateful and violent and asks them to abandon terrorism as a political tool regardless of the legitimacy of their grievances and the negative stereo-typing of the article.

As a noble prize-winner and a non-violent freedom fighter Ramos-Horta has the authority to criticise factions in the Middle East for their actions against the United States and it is a little naive of ETSA to think Ramos-Horta would not condemn these actions when many people in the United States helped FRETILIN achieve independence for East Timor. But more importantly it is a sign of how committed Ramos-Horta is to non-violent resistance.

Moreover Ramo-Horta’s commitment to non-violent resistance may annoy members of the ASEAN group because it attacks the behaviour of some governments toward their citizens who want the freedoms to speak about injustice. At another level it legitimises the struggles of minorities who are marginalised by the nationalism of their states. Having two Nobel Peace Prize winners in ASEAN highlights the need for an improvement in human rights and will cause some embarrassment for leaders in the years to come.

There is an old saying that some people are born great, some people are made great and some have greatness thrust upon them. One might argue that Jose Ramo-Horta was made great by the circumstance of his life. He became a political or diplomatic navigator through long years of bitter fighting, disappointment and failure. But his perseverance and determination harvested the skills, support and admiration that enabled him to win independence for East Timor. Beginning with his family who suffered from their own struggles for a better world they were able to send him to the best education available in East Timor. At his schools he met many future leaders, friends and connections that would aid him in the future and helped him to know his domestic enemies. Ramos-Horta’s deportation to Mozambique showed him a bigger world and the realities of war while putting him in contact with other Portuguese anti-colonial movements. His return to Timor and early work with FRETILIN taught all the young leaders of the resistance movement how to work as a team though these were some of the adverse years of their life with the invasion by Indonesia in an uncaring world.

Ramos-Horta’s exile in New York at the U.N. brought the young, provincial man sophistication, political astuteness and the networking of a larger group of supporters that he was able to use when the Indonesians made the fatal mistake at the Santa Cruz massacre. With the Indonesian capture of Xanana Gusmao, Ramos-Horta became the most important spokesperson in relating the FRETILIN message to the world but if Xanana’s capture was a blow the movement was revived with Ramos-Horta’s Nobel Peace Prize award. The Nobel Peace Prize gave Ramos-Horta the political and moral legitimacy and authority to challenge any government leader and opened diplomatic doors that had been closed to him in 1975. The collapse of the Suharto regime was the chance that the East Timorese seized in their hopes for self-determination because they had not only persevered but also learnt from the trials they had faced since the Portuguese decolonisation. One might argue that Ramos-Horta deserves the accolade being apolitical Magellan because metaphorically he navigated his people through the long night of foreign rule and came home to the safe port of independence.

Selected References
Cheshire, B. 2002, Dangerous Liaison, Australian Story transcript, ABC Teleivision, accessed 25/06/2003,
www.abc.net.au/austory/transcript/s485784.htm
Dunn,J. 2003, East Timor: a rough passage to independence, Longueville Books, Sydney.
Hill, H. 2002, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor, Fretilin 1974-1978, Otford Press, Sydney.
Lennox, R. 2000, Fighting Spirit of East Timor, the life of Martinho da Costa Lopes, Pluto Press, Sydney.
Mota, J.A.S. 1997, The Fight for Freedom of Timor Lorosae People, East Timor Student Movement, Yogyakarta.
Ramos-Horta, J. 1987, Funu: the unfinished saga of East Timor, The Red Sea Press Inc. Trenton, New Jersey.
Ramos-Horta, J. 1996, Towards a peaceful solutuion in East Timor, East Timor Relief Association, Sydney.
Ross, B. 1999, Inside Out, East Timor, Herman Press Melbourne.
Said, E.W. 1994, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage, London.
Smith, M. 2003, Peacekeeping in East Timor : the path to independence, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
Zubrycki, T. 2002, The Diplomat, Film Australia Ltd. in association with SBS independent, www.filmaust.com.

Friday

The Concept of S. E. Asia

In 2003 the Eastern and Oriental Express celebrated its tenth anniversary of rail travel between Singapore and Bangkok. The Orient Express Magazine, heralded this event as a landmark for South East Asia because many distinguished writers, personalities and important people travel by using this rail service. Moreover the magazine asserts that the rail journey is “designed to evoke the atmosphere of the film Shanghai Express” and “with its open air carriage you can almost reach out and touch the greenery” (Orient Express Magazine, 2003: 14).

This essay argues that the concept of South East Asia as a region is "capricious" because it is a creative label, bannered by influential groups at times when its fashion attains a political, financial or social advantage. Beginning with tourist marketing, "South East Asia," as a concept, was created through colonial, post-colonial and historic influences. This essay investigates South East Asia's position in a maritime setting, climatic zone and its agricultural practices and argues that these are the physical attributes that classify South East Asia but do not necessarily define its conception. This concept arises from institutions that intellectually, politically and often-times physically journey through era's of human occupation.

One might argue that the mix of labels, images and themes of the Eastern and Orient Express caters to the individual, who views South East Asia as a romantic place of adventure and is seduced by their own desire and perception about this region. Contemporaneously, 19th century South East Asia as a colonial region, was created by European desire and perception of a place that needed to be cultivated, harvested and guarded. Individuals in associations like the Academic Society of Indochina and the French Committee of Asia, became experts on colonial domains and interpreted South East Asia for their compatriots (Said, 1978: 219).

This occupation of interpretation of South East Asia during WW II and post war decolonisation became fashionable for universities like, Yale and Cornell, who could afford to replace the colonial officer or expert with libraries, collections and research projects. South East Asia was still viewed as a place that could be cultivated, harvested and guarded but Cold War "fears" shifted European views of South East Asia from the colony to a region of potential modernisation and development, of a "Western" ideal (Anderson, 1998: 9-10).

Moreover that dominant and enterprising forces, not necessarily foreign states, but companies such as the Orient Express, created South East Asia through the desires and needs of their era, which in turn was influenced by the activity and politics of the time. Harrison, (1954: ix-x) in one of the first "Western" chronicles of South East Asia, defined the region as a place of similar histories and politics without a specific governing or cultural identity. This climatically similar geographic archipelago and mainland, was mostly impacted by external influences as a focus of culture, commerce and the impacts of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.

South East Asia's distinctive feature of archipelagos, myriad coastal zones and river deltas allowed communication, a flow of trade, migrants and cultures by sea. Wolters (1999: 42-43) argues that this maritime character is not like the Mediterranean with its coastal cities acting as a terminus for the rest of Europe but rather, South East Asian coastal cities as royal centres and rest points to other destinations. Furthermore Coede's (1966: v) suggests that archipelagic and mainland South East Asia had two separate paths to "development," not reliant on a maritime character, with relations between Indo-Chinese states more important than ones with the Islamic influenced archipelago.

Perhaps Coede's(1966: v) argument is partly correct because mainland and archipelagic South East Asia chose separate paths for development but the rivers, coasts and island’s still acted as "super-highways" of communication and trade, through the faster water transport, rather than, crossing the densely forested landscapes that until recently were also a distinctive, if not, unique feature of South East Asia. Moreover this maritime character, with perhaps the Malayan/Portuguese port of Malacca as one historical precedent, has in colonial times and up to the present, been the defining factor in modernisation, development and strategic issues.

Before European colonialism Higham (2000: 14) argues that there has never been uniformity in South East Asia but acknowledges that the Kingdom of Angkor from 1000 to 1300 AD was a dominant culture. This lack of unity may be attributed to a linguistic diversity but this has not prevented other parts of the world from becoming united regions. Coede's (1966: 218)suggests that although each state in Indochina developed a civilisation of its own, the impact of Indian administrative and religious systems was a unifying factor. However archaeological research by Higham (2000: 14) indicates that development in South East Asia although influenced by an Indian “veneer” still received incremental change through local ancestral deities and customs.

Conversely Higham’s research is not supported by other sources of knowledge or research and requires proof that vested interests have not benefited or encouraged these results. For example, the Military Regime in Burma funded research into the paleontological origins of humans to legitimise their governance of the state. When Palaeolithic bones were discovered, by state sponsored research, undisturbed, intermingled and without wounds, this was perceived and argued as a precedent for the present day legitimisation of governance of Burmese ethnic groups who do not want to be governed by a Military Dictatorship (Steinberg, 2001: 61).

Dobby (1966: 15-16) uses a different classification for South East Asia by grouping it with Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, East China and Japan into a climatic zone of a “Monsoon Asia.” Further described as “a golden fringe to a beggars mantle” or “the golden crescent” because of its agricultural wealth, as the worlds third largest cultivated area which invests its harvest calendar in the reliability of the monsoon's. One might argue that rainfall is a substantive element in defining geographical areas but because “Monsoon Asia” is so vast and diverse it defeats the original purpose of finding a unitary concept of South East Asia. Moreover one might argue that this is another example of how institutions and enterprises view the naming and labelling of regions, especially its perception as a valuable agricultural "commodity" in world trade at the time of Dobby’s writing.

Traditional agriculture in South East Asia has until recently had different goals to the high yield cash crops of the industrialised world and for many centuries has effectively met the needs of the population. Small scale farmers place more importance on the stability, resilience and sustainability of their crops because farming societies in South east Asia customarily integrate with, rather than, control the agricultural system. Moreover the diverse crop choices of the small scale farmer has led to an insight into the availability and use of land, environmental considerations and the organisation of labour. The mono-cropping commercial farm, with the exception of rice or rubber plantation agri-business, was the trademark of traditional agriculture in South East Asia (Marten, 1986: 6-7). Development ambitions of governments since the 1970's have forced the small-scale farmer into producing cash crops using the technology of the "green revolution." Characterised by introduced plant species, fertilisers, pesticides and mechanised harvesting has changed shifting agriculture and home gardens into community field crops and and agri-businesses (Sein, 2003: 196).

Conversely one might argue that traditional agriculture is not a unique element in contributing to a concept of South East Asian because there are other parts of the world such as South America which have a traditional agriculture practice that has not created a unified label. However it is the foreign influences that brought the label, name and title of South East Asia to the region because of the opportunity of exploiting these unique agriculture practices for the political, commercial and social benefit of vested interests.

This essay illustrates how the naming and labelling of a region is manufactured by the influences of the time or era in which it is situated. Identifying elements that indicate regional cohesion can come from diverse or unifying characteristics but it is reliant on the perceptions and influences of the institutions that do the naming and labelling. The concept of South East Asia is capricious because it relies on the relevance at any given time or era on the importance of the characteristics that impact the region. For the Orient Express, marketing and capturing the image is the defining factor for naming and labeling its train service, which contributes to the title that a region is given.

Selected References
Anderson, B. 1998, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South East Asia and the World, Verso, London.
Coede's, G. 1966, The Making of South East Asia, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Dobby, E.H.G. 1966, Monsoon Asia, University Of London Press, London.
Harrison, B. 1954, South East Asia: a short history, MacMillan & Co. London.
Higham, C. 2002, Early Cultures of South East Asia, River Books, Bangkok.
Marten, C.G. 1986, Traditional Agriculture in South East Asia: a human ecological perspective, Westview Press, Boulder.
Said, E. 1978, Orientalism, Penguin Books, London.
Sein, C.L. 2003, South East Asia Transformed: a geography of change, ISEAS, Singapore.
Steinberg, D. 2001, Burma the State of Myanmar, Georgetown University Press, Georgetown.
Wolters, O.W. 1999, History, Culture and Region in South East Asia, SEAP, Ithaca.
2003, Orient Express Magazine, Volume 20, No. 2, The Illustrated London News Group, London.

Thursday

Gallipoli & Australian Nationalism

An Australian national consciousness was not born at the Battle of Gallipoli because it is an ideological construction that political leaders of the Australian State use to promote nationalism. In this essay I use select commemorative postage stamps, of the Australian State, to discuss the ideas and message their images represent. Along with coins, one might argue, that the images on postage stamps envision the national identity, consciousness and nationhood that the State wishes to promote. Also this essay defines three Australian nations, and for two of them, the importance of the Battle of Gallipoli. Furthermore, present attitudes are discussed to show how the variability of stories, legends and myths are used to persuade nations to justify, sanction and accept the actions, legitimacy and authority of the State.

There have been three nations of Australia, two of which have almost vanished, while the third and presently dominant nation uses the legends of the first and second nation, to legitimise the rule of the Australian State. The first nation of Australia, the indigenous inhabitants, have been recognised through High Court decisions such as the Mabo Case. However, history provides stronger recognition of this nation through the first international cricket test between Australia and England which was composed entirely of indigenous players. That the current national summer game was used and then ignored to identify a nation is an example of how appeals to the past and the lack of them are the usual methods of interpreting the present (Said, 1994:1).

The second Australian nation, labelled in this essay as the Wild Colonial Boy is the collective patriarchal child of convict settlers and colonialists who battled the Australian environment for a "better life" than their European "homeland." The "Wild Colonial Boy" in 1901, unified the six Australian colonies into a federated State. Its nationhood was developed by the belief that people belong to distinct groups or nations, created and promoted by the State to legitimise and authorise its statehood. The word nation and nationality comes from the Latin “natus” meaning birth and at the time of the Battle of Gallipoli, Australia was a newborn State of existing nations (Ball, 1991: 18).

Misunderstanding between national and state definitions can be illustrated by the public reaction to the first Australian postage stamp issued thirteen years after federation. Outrage at the use of a kangaroo in preference to the head of the King of England can be argued as a conflict between State and national identities which the "Wild Colonial Boy" had difficulty accepting (Roseblum, 1966: 205).

Now an independent State, the second nation of Australia had a bizarre identity as an Australian Nation dutiful to a British Monarchy but imprisoned by this monarchies culture, heritage and a convict status, excluding them from return and residence in the "homeland" of Britian (Said, 1994: 74).

Hobsbawn (1990: 6) argues that a nation does not build a State but that the policies of a State create nationalism and nationhood. The study of a national consciousness in the context of the Battle of Gallipoli would include both State and national attitudes, which make the definition of the nation problematic. Problematic because there are many different human collectives that are labelled as a nation but exceptions to the definition can always be found especially with emerging political units such as the federating six Australian colonies. The individual desire for identification is a primary and fundamental need of social and cultural existence and the classification of people into groups creates this concept of the nation and nations (Hobsbawn, 1990: 7). Stalin's (1947: 8) definition of a nation attempted to establish criteria for nationhood based on single attributes of language, cultural traits and common histories:

a nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture

However emerging political groups do not fit into a permanent framework or a united whole and it is nationalism that develops the principle of national consciousness. A nation is not a divine imposition of how people and political destiny are classified because it is nationalism that embodies the stories, legends and myths that create a national consciousness (Tarling, 1998: 75).

The former status of Australia as a penal colony gave the leaders of the British Empire a belief that they were superior in morals and riches. Redemption for the "Wild Colonial Boy" came from providing the Empire with resources to maintain its superiority. When the First World War began the "Wild Colonial Boy” was sent to Gallipoli in the hope that by proving his prowess on the battlefield he would erase the convict label and be accepted as an equal nation. The founding insight of anti-imperial nationalism is the awareness of ones-self belonging to a subject people and a culture, which imagines its own past in a way to gain independence from empire (Said, 1994: 198, 214).

For the twentieth anniversary of the battle of Gallipoli, the returned soldier's organisation asked to have a commemorative postage stamp issued and dedicated to the memory of those who lost their lives in WW1. The consensus was for a non-military theme and an agreement was reached on the image of the cenotaph in Whitehall, London, with the word ANZAC superimposed and surrounded by a laurel wreath (Roseblum, 1966: 217-218). The "Wild Colonial Boy" believed his participation in WW1 had raised the national morals of Australia to a level equal to the British and was expressed in speeches such as General Burwood's message to the Australian soldiers in France three days after the armistice:

never has the name of Australia stood higher than it does now throughout the world thanks to the bravery of her soldiers and it is up to everyone of us to see that this is maintained and no reproach can be cast on the Australian flag owing to any behaviour of ours (Adam-Smith, 1978: 333).

One might argue the "Wild Colonial Boy" did not redeem his convict heritage in the battles of WW1 and most especially at Gallipoli because the twentieth anniversary stamp illustrates the image of the cenotaph in London, not Sydney, Melbourne or elsewhere in Australia. It reinforces the idea that only in death could the "Wild Colonial Boy" return to the homeland of Britain and the Empire still ruled the Australian nation if not the Australian State. The "Wild Colonial Boy" was now stranded between the national traditions and culture of the British and the aspirations of Australian Statehood, creating a confusing national consciousness.

The University and public school men who were to be the future leaders of the second nation and federation of Australia, enlisted in the ranks to serve with friends and brothers. Unlike the British there were no special Corps of "upper class" citizens. This meant that units like the 10th Light Horse of Western Australia, were raised from the sons of almost every "well-known" pastoral family and eighteen months later were wiped out in a charge on enemy lines. The slaughter and incapacitation of the "Wild Colonial Boy" in the First and then Second World War would result in the demise of the second nation of Australia (Alomes, 1991: 172-173).

The third nation of Australia emerged from the refugees and émigrés escaping a Europe ravaged by the two world wars and came to Australia with new cultures, ideas and identities. The State had great difficulty in defining its identity and promoting a national consciousness when designing a commemorative migration postage stamp. In 1955, the cultural myths of the "Wild Colonial Boy" and Gallipoli were inadequate for an image of Australia and an attempt to produce a national consciousness through the celebration of immigration failed. The original commemorative stamp design of two men rotating a wheel of industry and framed by the title of "Greater Strength Through Migration" was unpopular with the government because of its communist representations (Cochrane, 1999: 19).

A public competition was organised and entries from all parts of the Australian State were exhibited in Department stores and other public spaces. Themes included industry, pastoralism, international cooperation, tractors, ships steelworks and maps of the world, which appeared to express one idea, that Australia was a place of hope. Moreover it excluded the mythical moral values of the Battle of Gallipoli; mateship, bravery and self-sacrifice. Unfortunately government officials were unable to decide on an acceptable image of Australia and the whole enterprise was abandoned (Cochrane, 1999: 20-21).

The Battle of Gallipoli is an event that has been honoured in Australia to a greater and lessor degree as a first step in its nationhood. This idea was very important in the 50th anniversary celebrations of the battle and unlike previous commemorative postage stamps a design was now required symbolising mateship, bravery and self-sacrifice as characteristic of Gallipoli veterans. A heroic image was found in the reproduction of Simpson and his donkey, drawn in the colours of khaki, navy blue and maroon to represent the army, navy and the ribbon of the Victoria Cross. These stamps were issued to restore the absent medals for the soldiers of the Battle of Gallipoli and acknowledged Australians sacrifice (Roseblum, 1966: 471-472).

One might argue that these images were a nationalist policy by the State to revive themes and myths of the Battle of Galipoli, as an appeal to Australians of a heroic precedent for the involvement in the Vietnam War. The remnants of the second Australian nation were beyond enlistment age but appeals to the spirit of the Battle of Gallipoli was a way in which the State could use the resources of the third nation of Australia for its own political ends. By the 75th anniversary of Gallipoli the commemorative images on Australian postage stamps had changed to include a broader range of themes and used to divert attention away from the traditional links with Europe to ones that were more engaging with South East Asia. Forster (1995: 12) argues:

a people's memory is largely constructed by the State. The government normally has the greatest resources at its disposal to shape how its citizens view their past and it can promote certain events and values while suppressing or downplaying others

Moreover the myth of the Battle of Gallipoli as a founding event in the history of the Australian State was now replaced with a broader range of military theatres because the myth no longer appealed to the new politics of the State. The five commemorative stamps of the 75th anniversary of Gallipoli included soldier’s wounded, gravesites, woman left behind as workers and modern weapons such as helicopters. The Battle of Gallipoli myth could not be ignored completely, as the 41-cent value stamp shows, but these stamps are further evidence of how the Stae creates a national consciousness and the method in which the State uses nationalism to promote its political goals.


Hewson (2002: 48) argues that our State leaders put their hands on their hearts on Anzac Day and revel in the mythical values and morals of the Battle of Gallipoli; mateship, bravery and self sacrifice, hoping that the myth will adhere to them. Prime Minister John Howard even tried to have these "values" written into a preamble of a proposed new constitution but it is now people the State chooses not to exclude that increasingly defines national consciousness and nationalism.

With the death of the last Gallipoli veteran in 2002, it is perhaps now time to look for new ways to examine the Battle of Gallipoli, for instnace, historically rather than as a defining element of Australian Statehood. Not all Australian men rushed to enlist in the days before the Battle of Gallipoli. Most were rejected on medical grounds and it is ironic, that three prominent and revered Australian Prime Ministers, Robert Menzies, John Curtin and Ben Chifley preferred to stay at home with their families in peace time occupations believing as individuals and as a nation they had no place in being killed in foreign countries (Day, 2002: 11). The Gallipoli story, myth and legend is more related to the psychological needs of the "Wild Colonial Boy" rather than the needs of the present Australian nation. Unfortunately in a historic sense, the Battle of Gallipoli turned an open view of the new Australian State back toward Britain and away from Asia. However Gallipoli has been forged into a potent founding story and is used by the State to hold onto the certainties of the past and enlist people into wars of the future (Day, 2002: 11).

There have been three Australian nations of Australia and all have contributed to the growth of the Australian State. Postage stamps can be a valuable tool in illustrating how States promote the stories, legends and myths of nations to promote national consciousness and nationalism and secure State legitimacy and bolster its authority. Gallipoli will continue to be a potent foundation story, to a greater or lessor extent because it is so seductive as a political tool for the leaders of the Australian State. What will continue to be problematic are the definitions and meanings of national consciousness and nationalism and how they impact the constituents of the nations that reside in the State.

Selected References
Adam-Smith, P. 1978, The Anzac's, Thomas Nielson Ltd. Melbourne.
Alomes, S. & Jones, C. 1991, Australian Nationalism: a documentary history, Harper Collins, Sydney.
Ball, T. 1991, Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal, Harper Collins, New York.
Cochrane, P. 1999, Queens, Crowns, Stamps and National Identity: The Millionth Migrant Exhibition, Art Monthly Australia,
No. 123, September, pp. 19-21.
Day, D. 2002, Let's lay the Anzac myth to rest, The Australian, Monday, May 20, 2002, p. 11.
Forster, R. J. 1995 Nation Making: Emergent identities in postcolonial Melanesia, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Hewson, J. 2002, Mateship Out, Exclusion In, The Australian Financial Review, Fairfax Publications, Friday, 26th April.
Hobsbawn, E. J. 1990, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Robertson, J. 1990, The Tragedy and Glory of Gallipoli: Anzac and Empire, Hamlyn, Melbourne.
Roseblum, A. A. 1966, The Stamps of the Commonwealth of Australia, 6th Edition, Acaia Press, Melbourne.
Said, E. W. 1994 Culture and Imperialism, Vintage Books, New York.
Stalin, J. 1947, Marxism and the national and Colonial Question, Lawrence and Wisart, London.
Tarling, N. 1998, Nations and States in South East Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.